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Abstract:
Review of 5 books on inequality:
1. Toxic Inequality: How America’s Wealth Gap DestroysMobility, Deepens the Racial
Divide, and Threatens Our Future by Thomas M. Shapiro
2. The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the
Twenty-First Century by Walter Scheidel
3. Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy by Phillipe
Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght
4. The Broken Ladder: How Inequality Affects the Way We Think, Live, and Die by
Keith Payne
5. After Piketty: The Agenda for Economics and Inequality edited byHeather Boushey,
J. Bradford DeLong and Marshall Steinbaum
Both Donald Trump’s election to the US presidency and Brexit — Britain’s impending divorce
from the European Union — have been read as populist rejections of today’s rising inequality,
driven by economic and political elites. But democracies do not necessarily reduce inequality.
Nor is it clear that UK Prime Minister Theresa May or Trump (or indeed French presidential
hopeful Marine Le Pen) will disentangle elites, state power and money. Indeed, a number of
Trump’s Cabinet appointments — such as Wilbur Ross, commerce secretary and billionaire
businessman — merely replaced Washington insiders with corporate insiders whose vested
interests have been vigorously questioned. These decisions, among others, lay bare the over-
lapping worlds of economic and political elites.
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However much in the news, income inequality is an ancient and intractable social, economic
and political condition. Now, five books examine its inevitability, both in terms of politi-
cal economy and consequences. They take the baton from social scientists Thomas Piketty,
Tony Atkinson, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, whose recent books have reignited this
global debate. Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Belknap Press, 2014) tries to hold
economics and politics together. He argues that inequality is a product of fundamental laws
of capitalism, and is also amenable to change through a global tax on financial transactions.
Atkinson’s Inequality (HarvardUniversity Press, 2015), withWilkinson andPickett’s The Spirit
Level (Allen Lane, 2009), argue that inequality can be curtailed through greater government
intervention in technological development and labour markets. What do the five new studies
add?
After Piketty, edited by Heather Boushey, J. Bradford Delong and Marshall Steinbaum, is a re-
sponse to what the editors describe as a less-than-healthy reaction from academic economists
to Piketty’s tome. This volume asks an interdisciplinary crowd of social scientists to tug at the
various threads of Piketty’s argument to see whether it unravels. It also includes a fascinating
essay from an emboldened Piketty making somewhat stronger claims regarding the potential
tominimise the inequality-generatingmechanisms of capitalism through, to take one example,
collective bargaining. The book serves as a fantastic introduction to Piketty’s main argument
and some of the key criticisms, includingwhether the return on capital will be higher than eco-
nomic growth in the long run. It also contains thoughtful interventions in debates about the
political economy of inequality. Economist Branko Milanovic, for instance, documents how
sharing capital more equally across the population may weaken the impact of a rising capital
share (when those who own capital gain more of an economy’s income) on inequality. Stem-
ming the tide of rising inequality in a period of slow growth may require redistribution of
capital, not just income.
This idea also lies at the heart of sociologist Thomas Shapiro’s Toxic Inequality. In it Shapiro,
an expert on public policy, explores the fault-lines of race within the landscape of inequal-
ity. Drawing on two sets of interviews with 137 American families of different ethnicities and
levels of income over a decade, he argues that class must not eclipse race as an explanation of
wealth inequality. The gap inmedian newwealth betweenWhite andAfrican American house-
holds trebled between 1984 and 2013. Piketty’s famous equation r > g (showing that returns
on capital grow faster than the economy) is not race neutral. And indeed, navigating upheavals
such as sickness or job loss was much harder for the African American families studied: many
of their parents had been locked out of opportunities for wealth accumulation, such as home
ownership. Shapiro argues that personal virtues alone, such as thrift or dedication, are not
enough to overcome these disadvantages — especially when policy (that is, healthcare cover-
age and housing regulations) makes it harder to build wealth. Yet, whether reforming private
pension policy, for example, would overcome decades of accumulated advantage is not fully
explored in Shapiro’s book.
One policy solution to the problems of wealth inequality not considered by Shapiro is basic in-
come, underwhich all citizens of a country are regularly issued an unconditional cash payment.
This is not, as social ethicist Phillipe Van Parijs and political scientist Yannick Vanderborght
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demonstrate in Basic Income, a new idea, but it is recently much discussed and social exper-
iments pop up with some regularity. In Finland, for example, the unemployed are paid 560
euros (US$590) per month even if they find work. The book is likely to become the primer on
the core debates, such as the scheme’s overall feasibility; but its most striking aspect is how the
authors make their argument. A basic income is justifiable not as a tool to address inequality,
but rather as an ‘instrument of freedom’. Theirs is not an economic argument, although they
explain the disincentives lucidly. Nor is it a social justice argument, although a basic income
would reduce almost all measures of inequality if set (as they suggest) at 25% of gross domestic
product per capita (US$1,163 per month in the United States). It is a philosophical argument
driven by concerns regarding liberty, and cutting across the political spectrum.
A basic income, however, would not necessarily solve the problems Keith Payne documents
in The Broken Ladder. Drawing on experimental psychology, Payne argues that the amount
of money you have is not the main determinant of well-being; what matters is how you feel
about it. The problem of inequality is relational, not economic. Poverty unquestionably harms
health, encourages bad decisions and creates instability. But the keymessage of Payne’s book is
that who are not deprivedmay act as if they are— because they feel relatively poor. Compress-
ing the bottom of the income distribution through, for example, a basic income is not enough;
you need to compress the top as well. When it comes to how this should be done, however,
the implications of Payne’s experiments are far less clear. They hint at why inequality harms
people, but they do not demonstrate that merely ‘shortening the ladder’ (that is, reducing in-
equality) will improve well-being. Consider a society that lowers inequality by taxing their
rich and simply throwing their money into the sea. Will this society be better off, healthier and
happier? If not, then how societies reduce inequality matters.
For historian Walter Scheidel this is precisely the problem. In his magisterial socio-political
historyTheGreat Leveller, inequality is shown as preferable to the alternative: society ‘levelled’
by vast upheavals, such as revolution, state collapse and disease. As Scheidel shows in a nar-
rative spanning recent prehistory to the twenty-first century, the rich were only dispossessed
by wars, plagues or cataclysms like the French Revolution. And other levelling programmes,
such as welfare states and the deepening of democracy, are the product of conflict. It was the
Second World War that spawned the British National Health Service. Scheidel concludes that
ridding ourselves of inequality inevitably involves great suffering.
Scheidel also shows that the pressures driving inequality predate not only capitalism, but the
state itself. They began with the shift towards agriculture that ignited the ‘Great Disequaliza-
tion’ of the Holocene, manifest in the elaborate burials of the few. Later, inequality actually
contributed to the development of the state, allowing elites to create collectivized mechanisms
of extraction and accumulation, such as through slavery. Scheidel’s political economy of in-
equality is remarkably consistent across eras despite dramatic shifts in configuration; the polity
stabilises hierarchies of power and resources, allowing a privileged few to acquire even more
wealth. Political and economic elites have always had close ties and – for Scheidel – the differ-
ence between Trump’s Cabinet and the senate of ancient Rome is only a ‘matter of degree’.
Fear of communism following the world wars motivated elites in the West to create social
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security and, in some cases, universal health care, resulting in sustained levelling. Certainly,
inequality is on the political agenda, but nowmotivations are different— today, economic elites
fear slowgrowth and the retrenchment of free trade. These are real threats to generating shared
prosperity and reducing poverty. But they are unlikely to be sufficient to prompt substantial
restructuring of the distribution of income and wealth within countries. What’s clear from
these five very different takes is that, notwithstanding the rise of populism and resentment
among the so-called ‘left behind’, inequality is not going away.
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